Causal Theories of Knowledge Undermined

Miloš Taliga

Abstract

The paper deals with the main differences between causal theories of knowledge and critical rationalism (which is taken to be one of the evolutionary epistemologies). Causal theories are probed from an evolutionary viewpoint which doubts their main thesis that S knows that \( p \) only if the fact that \( p \) is the cause of S’s belief that \( p \). Further doubts concern the hybrids of causal theories with reliabilism, and their relation to \textit{a priori} knowledge and to naturalized epistemology. The author argues that there is no reason to naturalize epistemology, and every reason to naturalize causation. Accordingly, he tries to deal with the problems of causation in evolution, of blindness of trials and of completeness of evolutionary science. Some remarks on the difference between evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary science, on teleology and on determinism are made there too.

For the paper you will need to consult the journal in hard copy. The paper is available in: \textit{Epistemologia. An Italian Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Vol. 32 (2009), No. 1, pp. 111-126.